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Abstract Is Confucianism compatible with citizenship? If yes, how? Cultural trans-
formation in recent citizenship studies provides a theoretical junction to bring the two
concepts together. In terms of cultural citizenship, this paper explores the making of
Confucian cultural citizens by analyzing students’ discourses in a Chinese Confucian
classical school. It reveals (1) the process of moral self-transformation, whereby the
individualities are embedded into ethical relations by the extensive readings of classical
literature; (2) practically discursive contradictions between individualism and authori-
tarianism that is based on the notion of a cultural hierarchy; and (3) the institutional
predicament in striving for the recognition of cultural citizenship by the state and
society. Finally, it concludes that the dilemmas in discourses and status are part of
the contradictions in the overall Chinese party-state’s management of individualization.
Keywords Citizenship . Confucianism . Individualism . Hierarchy .Morality . Ethical .
Individualization
Introduction
Since Engin Isin [7, 13] raised the issue of ‘citizenship after orientalism’, the study of
citizenship in the cosmopolitan academic community has made conscious efforts to cast
off the tendencies of essentializing citizenship as an Euro-American framework that
generalizes the experiences of other non-Western states or societies, and has reflexively
turned to a local perspective in order to investigate the ‘roots’ of specific citizenship
regimes in light of the local conditions of political systems, social structures and
cultural recourses. Although citizenship is often seen as a Western conception (see
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for example [32], p.vii; [38], p.313), this does not mean there are no acts of citizenship
in non-Western societies [11]. As Isin ([11], p.1) convincingly argues, there are
increasingly new ways for acts of citizenship to advance the claim for citizenship rights
in societies that lack legal or political recognition of the citizenship status.
In critically thinking about Chinese citizenship, we need to consider indigenous
resources, for example, Confucianism and the communist party-state system ([14],
p.28), together with the Western ideas of citizenship, so as to achieve a better under-
standing of the Chinese context. In this paper I pay attention to the relationship between
Confucianism (Confucian education) and the making of cultural citizenship. At first
glance it perhaps seems absurd to mention the two concepts together. This response may
arise from a presupposed bias towards both Confucianism and citizenship. As I clarified
elsewhere [37], on the one hand, Confucianism has long been considered as a form of
authoritarianism rather than liberalism [24], collectivism rather than individualism [8],
obligations-orientated rather than rights-orientated [10], and advancing particularism
rather than universalism [4, 19, 20]. On the other hand, liberal citizenship has been the
mainstream paradigm since T. H. Marshall’s classical citizenship framework that
equates citizenship with the evolutionary achievements of civil, political and social
rights [21]. However, all of these understandings and interpretations are one-sided. By
conceptualizing citizenship as either thin or thick and Confucianism as either liberal or
illiberal, I theoretically expounded three interpretations: incompatibility (thin citizenship
& illiberal Confucianism), compatibility (thin citizenship & liberal Confucianism), and
reconstruction (thick citizenship & liberal and illiberal Confucianism) [37].
Nevertheless, the above normative argument neglects a pivotal cultural transforma-
tion in recent citizenship studies that unpacks the legal and political aspects of
citizenship and turns to the cultural dimension, which, as I will argue in the following,
potentially offers a point of contact to connect Confucianism and cultural citizenship as
well as to deepen our understanding of ‘Confucian (cultural) citizenship’. Traditional
citizenship studies did not pay much attention to the cultural dimension of citizenship
([29], pp.1–2), but one’s formal legal status, as Turner ([34], pp.11–12) argues, ‘is
closely associated with the particular cultural forms of law in a given society.’
Influenced by globalization, post-modernization and decolonization, the presupposed
binding of citizenship and nation-state has begun to unravel, and the fragmentation of
public tastes and diversification of lifestyles have impaired the assumed homogeneity
of culture [29, 33, 34]. As a result, the claims for cultural citizenship increasingly
appear in such areas as new media, education, consumption, and lifestyles, among
others, where different cultural groups are able to discursively defend the right or
legitimacy of their own cultures and constructively participate in a more inclusive
cultural public domain [25–27, 29, 30, 41].
There are two major approaches of cultural citizenship outlined by Delanty [6]: the
first approach, represented by Will Kymlicka, is of the view of liberal communitarian-
ism, which emphasizes the necessity of creating an established state where diverse
cultural identities are accommodated, cultural differences are respected and tolerated,
and the rights of excluded or marginalized cultural groups are recognized (also see
[17]). The second approach, presented by Nick Stevenson, is from the perspective of
cultural sociology, which shifts the focus of citizenship into common experiences,
learning processes and discourses of empowerment (also see [29]). The most important
dimension of the second approach concerns the cultural discourses in daily practices,
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whereby individuals conflate the personal and the political dimensions of citizenship
and give rise to new demands for (cultural) rights in informal communicative situations
and ordinary life experiences [6].
Cultural citizenship in the sense of cultural sociology, as I see it, offers a junction to
bring Confucianism and citizenship together. The learning process, for example, is not
only underlined by cultural citizenship where the cultural citizens embed the self into
social relations and acquire knowledge about the self and the relationship of the self and
others in daily practices [6, 29], but is also highlighted in Confucian thoughts where the
self is an ethical one or whole, where ‘particular kinds of obligations and entitlements
by which we live varies largely according to the social roles that one plays’ ([31],
p.245). Moreover, cultural citizenship adopts a subjective perspective and focuses on
the reflexivity and cognition of individual citizens; likewise, Confucianism attaches
great importance to self-cultivating practices in order to make the superior man (junzi),
who reflexively and autonomously achieves learning that is sound in theory and
practice (neisheng waiwang). In addition, cultural citizenship stresses common expe-
riences where individuals reach mutual understandings and learn to respect each other,
which exactly resonates with Confucian key words such as compassion (ceyin),
benevolence (ren) and forgiveness (shu). More importantly, although the term ‘right’
does not appear in Confucian texts, there are implicit elaborations with respect to ‘right’
or examples of citizenship right practices in Confucianism [15, 16, 28, 37].
In this chapter, I explore cultural citizenship for students who read Confucian
classics in a classical school by examining the complexity and contestation of their
cultural (moral) discourses. I understand ‘citizenship’, as Engin Isin ([12], p.371)
claims, to be ‘a dynamic … institution of domination and empowerment that govern
who citizens … are and how these actors are to govern themselves and each other in a
given body politic. Citizenship is not membership. It is a relation that governs the
conduct of (subject) positions that constitute it’ (italics in original). From the above-
mentioned perspective of cultural sociology, I regard cultural citizenship in this paper as
a process of socio-symbolic practices to reflexively interpret one’s social, cultural and
political conditions by creating symbolic and social boundaries [18]1 and constructively
act to generate an identity or position and a reflexive understanding of it. More
specifically, I will discuss Confucian cultural citizenship, a term that could be defined
as a process to reflexively reconstruct one’s conduct and ethical relations according to
Confucian values in discursive and actual practices by drawing upon socio-symbolic
boundaries. In this study, the exploration of cultural citizenship is accomplished by
revealing the processes through which the classical school students are reflexively
‘being made’ and ‘(self) making’ [23] (new) identities (positions), mainly through the
symbolic and social space of classical education. In addition to the second part of
methodology, the third section shows the individuality and ethicality in Confucian
students’ cultural discourses, and the fourth explores the practically discursive conflicts
between individualism and authoritarianism, which are based on cultural hierarchy. In
1 Lamont and Molnar [18] introduce a distinction between symbolic and social boundaries. According to their
research, symbolic boundaries ‘are tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree
upon definitions of reality’, while social boundaries ‘are objectified forms of social differences manifested in
unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities’
([18], p.168).
Individuality, Hierarchy, and Dilemma 437
the final remarks, I discuss the institutional predicament that Confucian students face
on the basis of summarizing the conclusions derived from the previous parts.
Research Methodology
The resurgence of the Confucian classical school began in the mid-1990s in Mainland
China, and has been growing rapidly in minjian (civil) society since the early 2000s.
Among different types of classical education advocated by various individuals or
cultural groups, the most popular and also the most influential is that of children
reading classics (ertong dujing), primarily initiated by Dr. Wang Caigui, who has
devoted his life to encouraging Chinese students, especially those under the age of
13, to repeatedly read/memorize ancient Chinese classics.2 The core of the pedagogy
proposed by Caigui is pure and massive (laoshi daliang) readings of classics, without
having to understand the meanings of the classical texts. My fieldwork school faithfully
follows Dr. Wang’s educational philosophies and pedagogic practices. Different to most
old-style small private schools (sishu) that have no official schooling credentials, my
case school has a formal license issued by the local administration to offer primary and
secondary education.
I carried out the first ethnographic fieldwork in the classical school in 2012, visiting
again in 2013 and 2015. The two main methods of data collection are participant
observation and informal interviews with students in the classroom or other places. As
it was a boarding school where students were required to stay at school for entire
weeks, I was allowed to live on campus and spend all day with students and teachers,
thus I could conveniently participate in classroom interactions and daily practices and
communicate with them in everyday situations. I interviewed 18 students in 2012 aged
12 to 22, and had four group discussions in two classes made up of 31 students aged 14
to 18 in 2015, both of which constitute the main data resources of this paper.
Moral Boundaries, Individuality, and Ethicality: Moralizing the Self
Moral Boundaries
When I asked students what changes the classical education (jingdian jiaoyu) has
brought them, almost all of them responded by comparing their performances and
experiences in the classical school with those in the state-maintained systematic schools
(tizhi xuexiao). This is understandable, given that most students at the classical school
once studied in the systematic schools and shared similar ‘unhappy’ experiences there.
When they recalled the systematic schooling experience, they made use of moral
discourses to draw symbolic boundaries by describing state-maintained education as
2 According to Wang Caigui [35, 36], any education should primarily consider three principles: contents,
methodology, and time. He claims that his theories of children reading classics best correspond to these three
principles, that is to say, to teach students the best and highest wisdom in classics (contents) by repeatedly
reading and memorizing (methodology) before the age of 13 years old, an age period when children are best at
memorizing rather than comprehending (time). Based on this, he confidently asserts that classical education is
consistent with the natural development of human nature.
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something immoral and explaining how they felt and why they dropped out. In an
informal interview with students A and B, they criticized the current state-maintained
educational system that goes against human nature and suppresses the development of
students’ moral conscience.
Student A: I think [systematic] education nowadays has been stifling children,
making them dare not to tell the truth and blindly pursue their external perfor-
mance, and finally, [systematic education] has become inhuman [educational
institution].
Student B: [Systematic education] lets student learn how to deceive people.
Saying that there is one question, if you do not know the answer, the teacher
would beat you. And then the next time, when you encounter the same question,
you still cannot deal with it, but when the teacher says whoever is able to solve it
can raise their hands, you will raise your hand even if you do not know the
answer.
Student A: You’re right.
The ‘immorality’ of systematic education was asserted by almost all of my inter-
viewees who had studied in the classical school for over 3 years. In their views, the
‘immoral’ systematic education encourages the ‘mass production of Binferior
products^’, and therein ‘products’ refer to students, and ‘inferiority’ could be under-
stood as ‘immorality’ or ‘morally inferior’. Another issue of the ‘immorality’ of the
bureaucratic educational system, as some of my interviewees claimed, was the inadequacy
of independence and self-determination, especially for schools’ principals and teachers.
As one student told me, the ‘moral weakness’ of current systematic education is shown in
the fact that teachers ‘cannot make decisions by themselves’, and consequently, even
though ‘they might realize education should not be [as it is nowadays], it has to be what it
is now’. On the contrary, classical educationwas acclaimed as ‘moral’ bymy interviewees,
as a 14-year-old male student who began reading classics at six said:
Everyone has improved after reading classics, although in different aspects. Most
are as such, but it does not exclude the few [who do not develop]. That the
majority is moving in the right direction proves that, in the systematic schools,
most people still stay at the starting line. I had a good friend who studied in the
same class [in the systematic school]. When I returned [home] to visit him, [I
saw] his hair covered one eye just in order to go with whatever was fashionable.
To most of my interviewees, the failure of systematic education to moralize citizens
results from the examination-orientated (yingshi) approach that exerts high pressure by
demanding students complete a large amount of homework on top of their arduous
schoolwork. Almost all of my interviewees complained about the ‘overload of home-
work’ and ‘endless examinations’ that made them feel depressed, frustrated and finally
weary of studying, which can also be regarded as a form of resistance to examination-
orientated schooling. In addition, they objected to the pedagogic pattern by not doing
homework, skipping classes, fighting with classmates, squabbling with teachers, or
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even stealing, according to my interviews. More importantly, examination-orientated
education also created a school hierarchy based mainly on test scores or examination
ranks, which not only puts students on different academic levels, but also morally
hierarchizes their social network within the classroom. One of my interviewees, an 11-
year-old boy, shed tears when he told me about his previous experience in the
systematic school, where students were divided into different hierarchies according to
academic performances, and teachers treated ‘good’ students who achieved higher
scores much better than ‘bad’ ones whose grades were lower. As he always ranked
last in the whole class, he felt despised, neglected and was even cursed by teachers in
the systematic school; moreover, he had no friends because no one would play with a
‘bad’ student. I was shocked when he said he would commit a crime or suicide if he had
stayed there any longer. Additionally, my interviewees often labeled themselves as ‘bad
students’ (huai xuesheng), not only according to their lower rank in academic perfor-
mance but also in the light of ‘bad’ habits and manners in their eyes, such as going
against the teachers, hanging out in the classroom, smoking, and fighting, which, as
mentioned above, are also seen as resistance tactics by them.
On the other hand, they also began to reflect morally upon themselves to ‘wipe out’
the ‘evil’ practices, which empowered them with the courage to take action in order to
break the link with systematic schooling. They attributed their ‘moral degeneration’, a
phrase used by a student, to the ‘immoral’ configuration of the systematic school itself,
whose practical aim was merely, according to my interviewees’ viewpoints, to unify
individual students into an easily regulated disciplinary pattern by establishing a
rationally calculable and operable examination-score hierarchy. In other words, the
moral suppression of the subjectivity from the examination-based hierarchy in the
systematic schools ironically highlighted their individuality and generated a spirit of
individual resistance, which encouraged the individuals to escape the burden of the
dominating disciplinary model and turn to classical education for moral self-cultivation.
Individuality
Individuality, or the consciousness of one’s own particularity, is a crucial characteristic
embodied in my interviewees. Almost all of them expressed their aspiration to escape
from the domination of systematic schooling when I asked about their initial motivation
to read classics. They told me they enjoyed studying in the classical school firstly
because the pressure of homework was completely released; they did not have to be
censored or evaluated by the point-based hierarchy, as there were no examinations at
all; and teachers and classmates treated them equally and considerately. In a word, to
my interviewees, to read classics liberated their individuality from the domination of
the state-maintained schooling system, and encouraged them to pay much attention on
the cultivation of the self, as the following conversation between an interviewee (B) and
me (A) shows.
A: Do the teachers exert pressure on you to memorize [classics]?
B: Of course not. As long as you do your best, any [performance] is appreciated,
even if you fail to recite [the required contents]. To memorize only 100 characters
is also considered an achievement.
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In reading a large number of classics, students, all of my interviewees included, were
encouraged to be responsible, honest, moral and ethical. Another example is from a 9-
year-old girl who told me she felt at ease in memorizing classics because although she
had just entered the classical school and had been there for only 2 months, the teacher
did not push her to catch up with the whole class, rather she was allowed sufficient time
to get used to the study methods, provided with a suitable study plan according to her
own capabilities, encouraged to study by herself, and the teachers emphasized the
importance of learning from the heart (yongxin xue).
Reading/memorizing classics was regarded as a process of moral transformation of
the self to ‘wipe out’ the ‘evil’ habits, to eliminate ‘uncivilized’ behavior, and more
importantly, to reconstruct a new and ‘good’ disposition. Central to the ‘moral’ merits
was willpower (dingli), the key quality presumably to be cultivated in the classical
education. One interviewee, when talking about what changes the memorization of
classics brought about in him, said:
At the beginning, of course, it was boring. [You might ask yourself] why I have to
read [classics] and what use it is. Very boring. Probably and gradually [you are]
getting used to the boredom, [and it finally] turns out to become a matter of
willpower, which increases your toughness in life. Now [I would] feel anxious if I
did not read classics for a couple of days.
In the same vein, another interviewee told me that he even tore up the classical
textbook when he started reading classics. As the classical pedagogy only requires
students to spend the whole day memorizing Chinese and Western classics without any
interpretations of the texts, most of my interviewees admitted that they felt uninterested
in the classical mode of learning at the beginning. However, with the instruction of the
teachers, they gradually learned to consider the boredom of memorization as a way of
tempering their willpower, and a process of developing their capabilities in self-control
and self-discipline. Hence, from their perspective, to persevere in memorizing an
abundance of classics was a form of moral self-cultivation in order to overcome
‘bad’ qualities such as laziness, impatience, fickleness, lack of concentration and poor
stamina.
Moral self-reflection also played an important role in transforming students into
autonomous learners who were able to reflexively regulate study arrangements when
they realized that it was for their own sake, instead of anything else, to abundantly
memorize classics, as one interviewee told me:
I feel that [it is] not merely to memorize classical texts, but to transform a person
as a whole. At the beginning, I didn’t want to enter the classroom at all. One or
two years later, little by little, [I’ve] got the desire to advance. [It’s] not to do what
other people want you to do, but to yourself aspire to make progress.
Self-motivation to learn is appreciated by Confucianism as a core attribute, hence the
significant attention is paid to its cultivation in classical education, where students are
deliberately shaped to become active learners whose inner dynamic results from a
reflexive self-control of one’s ‘evil desires and sentimental impulses’, as one student
stated. To put it another way, by rationally increasing one’s capabilities of self-control,
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self-discipline, self-management and self-supervision, one could exploit the inner
motivation to learn. These self-governing qualities were overwhelmingly admired by
the students, among whom one interviewee admitted feeling anxious and guilty if she
could not finish her daily tasks of memorization. Indeed, she positioned her current self
in opposition to her previous self in the systematic school, a person who ‘was tired of
study even if the academic performance was worse than others’ and finally ‘gave up on
myself hopelessly’.
Along with the improvement of the moral self-governing self through abundantly
memorizing classics, students gradually became aware of their life ambitions or career
aspirations, clearly or vaguely, firmly or indecisively. For example, a 17-year-old girl
told me she had ‘set up a plan to engage in the cause of promoting classical education in
the future’. By regarding reading classics in the classical school ‘as a turning point
where my life that had been going down was lifted up’, she realized ‘a sense of life
direction’. Other interviewees disclosed their life dreams to become, for example, a
Confucian philosopher, a physical scientist, or a businessman in the digital and
technology sector. No matter how their life goals varied, all of my interviewees
considered the memorization of classical texts as the foundation for achieving their
goals. Another interviewee, who claimed that it was through reading classics that she
slowly discovered her life’s direction, quoted a sentence from the Confucian Analects,
saying that Bthe Master said, BAt 15 I set my heart upon learning.^’3 As she stated,
‘although I am later than Confucius, I’ve finally got one [life goal].… Consequently, I
have no confusion [in my life].’
Ethicality
The moralization of students in the classical school not only generates the moral
qualities of individuality, but also highlights the ethicality in my interviewees’ moral
discourses. Correspondingly, the self of a Confucian cultural citizen is one of individ-
uality and ethicality, both of which are difficult to detach from one another because a
moral/ethical self in Confucianism is reflexive and therefore able to reconstruct a
rational relationship with itself as well as with others. An interviewee who had read
classics in full-time education for 6 years when interviewed recounted his improved
rationality in controlling his own emotions and learning how to conduct himself
calmly:
Previously I was always disgruntled, and felt I could do anything [I wanted] as
long as I was unhappy. But afterwards [I] felt that such behaviors were wrong,
and would annoy others. [Since then] I have gradually changed myself. Being a
man (zuoren) is to constantly struggle with one’s self, not to fight with other
people. Prior to reading classics I felt myself to be an angular stone, [but since I
began reading classics, the edges and corners] have been grinded slowly.
The reflection upon one’s self corresponds to the above-mentioned moralization
whereby ‘evil’ habits can be removed and a ‘good’ disposition can be created, but here
3 See Book II Wei Chang in Confucian Analects, translated by James Legge, Shanghai: Sanlian Bookstore,
p.12.
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I highlight the ethical self, a concept of the self that is embedded in social relations. The
moral enhancement of the self means one is able to rationally and reasonably deal with
the ethical relations with his/her self by, as the interviewee disclosed, realizing that, for
instance, his/her own conduct might cause trouble for other people. The moral feeling,
specifically the sense of compassion, was the key point to associate one’s self with
others in social settings. According to Mencius, having sympathy for others is indic-
ative of morality,4 which was also suggested by an interviewee who evaluated himself
as a person who always took pity on people and believed that all humans were morally
good inwards and were able to achieve moral enhancement.
Family ethics or the ethical reflection upon how to handle family relations was
specifically stressed in students’ discourses. One student informed me that the relation-
ship with his parents was remarkably improved since he studied in the classical school,
and he learned to talk with parents and think about problems from their point of view.
He admitted that before reading classics, he ‘seldom communicated with them at
home,’ at times having bitter quarrels. In his mind, it was reading classics that brought
him ethical self-transformation. Another interviewee stressed the importance of filial
piety (xiaoshun). By critically reflecting upon his previous disobedient behaviors, he
realized he should patiently listen to their words, see things from their perspective, and
help them with housework.
In the same vein, they also learned to be responsible to the family. For example, by
applying the Confucian self-cultivating technique ‘seeking the cause in oneself’ (fan
qiu zhu ji), an interviewee recalled the experience after his parents divorced, and
criticized himself for failing to actively and positively communicate with them but
instead escaping by frequenting internet bars. Consciousness of responsibility was not
confined to the family domain, but also extended to schooling. As a female interviewee
told me, classics taught her how to get along well with classmates:
In the past, if someone hit me, I must hit back. [However,] now if someone beat
me or someone else, I will ask him/her why do you hit people, and persuade him/
her [not to do it again].…When I see someone looking unhappy, I will help him/
her to find out the reason. I used to help people too, but not seriously. Now I
genuinely dare to face [others], to work out [the problem]. I cannot only deal with
my own [problems], but I also help others. When [you see] someone improve due
to your help, you feel especially happy, happier than when you improve yourself!
At a more fundamental level, in moralizing the self through the memorization of
classics, my interviewee reproduced two types of discourses: one is the individualistic,
and the other is the ethical. The two do not oppose to each other, but go together to
reconstruct new Confucian cultural citizens, who are not only able to independently
regulate their own speech and behaviors and to autonomously stimulate themselves to
study for the fulfillment of their life ambitions, but they also have the potential to
creatively reshape the ethical relationship with their own ‘selves’ as well as with other
people, whether at home or at school. This largely resonates with the term ‘ethical self’
portrayed by Nuyen ([22], p.132), which regards the Confucian self as ‘not defined in
4 See Book II Kung-sun Chau in The Works of Mencius, translated by James Legge, Shanghai: Sanlian
Bookstore, pp.77–79.
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terms of the individual, but in terms of the relationship between the individual and his
or her community.’ Another echoed concept is ‘moral individualism’ coined by
William Theodore De Bary ([5], pp.23–25), meaning that individuals achieve sustain-
able development of the self in ethical practices and moral interactions. As a result, my
interviewees as whole achieved a new morally individual self-image, an independent,
self-reliant, active, responsible, compassionate and benevolent self, which differed
sharply from the repressed, hopeless, spiritless and passive self in the state-
maintained systematic schools.
Hierarchy, Authoritarianism, and Individualism: the Discursive Paradox
The confusion that my interviewees encountered in learning classics by rote was how to
deal with the contradiction between memorizing massive classics and incomprehension
of them. In the struggle with it, they produced a type of hierarchical discourse by
ascribing their difficulty in comprehending the classical connotations to their inferiority
of cultural sophistication or low level of self-cultivation. Hence, in order to understand
the principles of classical literature, in their views, they first needed to reach a cultural
level as high as that of the authors. Memorizing a great number of classics was regarded
as the foundation to increase one’s cultural capability and moral hierarchy, as one
interviewee stated,
First of all, as a person, if he wants to achieve something, he must jump out of
himself to read the best books, the first-class books, to write first-class calligra-
phy, and to become the most superior person. [He] must stand on the highest
point to look at problems down from the top.
The cultural discourses of hierarchy were also involved in creating students’ notions
of social interactions. By dividing people into different hierarchies according to their
levels of wisdom, one interviewee held the opinion that one should ‘listen to a person
who has wisdom at a higher level’, because she could ‘obtain higher understanding of
life so as to increase her own cultural level’. Furthermore, students also made use of
hierarchical discourses to evaluate their teachers. For the most part, they admired the
teachers at the classical school and considered them to be of profound insight or of
‘high’ wisdom. Consequently, they believed these teachers stood higher in the cultural/
moral/wisdom hierarchy, and as students, they should follow what teachers told them to
do. This evokes the idea of authoritarianism, which played an important role in shaping
students’ mentality and ideology to become Confucian cultural citizens. The idea of a
cultural/moral hierarchy functioned as the backbone of the notion of cultural/moral
authoritarianism, both of which were taken up by students for self-discipline. In other
words, the basic reason why they thought it was ‘right’ to follow teachers’ instructions
and ‘wrong’ to contradict them was the culturally hierarchical conception that classified
teachers to be of a higher grade and students of a lower grade. As one interviewee said,
I would like to say, [whether a teacher should be] democratic or authoritarian, it’s
up to what the students are. If for example all are little babies, they know nothing
about democracy.… I prefer an authoritarian teacher, because I myself know my
444 C. Wang
knowledge is not profound enough yet, and the teacher knows more than me.
Consequently, [whatever] the teacher says, my first feeling tells me she is right.
So I think an authoritarian teacher is important to me.
This view was shared by many other interviewees who perceived the obedi-
ence to the teacher as ‘modesty’, ‘courtesy’, ‘having wisdom’, and ‘thoughtful-
ness’, all of which were often cited during interviews by students who believed
that as someone young whose life experience and wisdom were less than those
of teachers, they were not ‘qualified’ to raise critical questions. The keyword
‘qualification’ here, according to my interviewees, referred either to one’s capac-
ity or eligibility to express different opinions from the classics or the teachers. In
addition, teachers also used the word to produce culturally authoritarian and
hierarchical discourses, which reversely created students’ notion of obedience.
One example was the head teacher of the classical school discouraged students
from raising criticism against the tentative pedagogic reformation of reading
English classics. As she said to the whole class formally and arbitrarily:
All students! Put down your stubbornness. Put down your prejudice. [Don’t]
consider yourself always right. Stop self-approbating. Put all your biases down.
OK, let me say it again: just follow the new method. Insofar as the effects, you
can discuss with me 3 months later, but do not argue with me now. Don’t argue
with me.
As a student told me, there was no discussion at all between students and
teachers about the necessity of changing the methodology or how to employ the
new learning approach. They were just required by the teacher to give up the
previous type of study and turn to embrace the new one. Surprisingly, according
to interviews with students, most of them neither felt anything ‘incorrect’ or
‘morally bad’ nor showed dissatisfaction or complaint about being deprived of
the freedom to express their own individual opinions. Instead, they told me they
agreed with what the head teacher said, that is, firstly to try the new method for
3 months, and then wait to see the effects. Not only did students not exhibit any
argumentative attitudes, but also teachers faithfully complied with the new
pedagogy that was originally raised by the principal, who was himself deter-
mined to promote the reform without negotiation with the other teachers. This
case further showed the authoritarian governance structure of the classical
school, in which the principal had the dominant power in school affairs while
teachers and students lacked ways to express their different opinions in a public
forum. To students, the authoritarian regime of the classical school conversely
radicalized their notion of hierarchy and authoritarianism, which resulted in their
‘silence’ in school affairs and intensified their compliance with the teachers.
Authoritarianism, both in the cultural discourses and in the governing config-
uration, directly went against individualism, which trapped students in a morally
contradictory situation. An interviewee who claimed to have grown up in an
American-style democratic family where she was encouraged to do everything
independently and equally negotiated any issues with her parents told me that
she felt embarrassed and unhappy in her class because of the teacher’s
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enforcement. By labeling herself as ‘resistant’, she recounted the experience of
‘going against’ the head teacher in the following conversation between her (B)
and me (A).
A: Does the unhappiness come from the teacher?
B: Yes. I think the teacher also has … Between the head teacher and me there is
… Anyway I think I have … I have a kind of resistance. I am a resistant.
A: Do you go against the head teacher?
B: Not that kind of resistance. What I mean is, if someone has a different opinion
from mine, I will put forward my own views, regardless of her being happy or
unhappy.
A: What opinions of the head teacher did you argue against?
B: [When] she raised a point of view, no one would dare to contradict, but I
would say [something different] secretly in my heart.
A: Did you want to argue?
B: Yes I did.
A: Did you once argue?
B: Yes I did.
A: And as a result …
B: [I was] educated by criticism. I think she was much better [than other
teachers], just to educate me in private.
A: Well, not in the class?
B: No. But there was still pressure.
However, more of my interviewees disagreed with opposing teachers and
criticized ‘going against’ their authority as ‘a bad habit’ or the display of the
‘immoral disposition’. As a student argued, ‘the teacher is teacher and the
student is student in Chinese educational background, and it must have been
the same since ancient times.’ They defended the authority of teachers, and even
asserted that an authoritarian teacher was someone who truly took responsibility
to propagate the wisdom of the classics to assure students’ ‘correct’ way of life
in the future. They claimed that it did not accord with the custom (he guiju) to
offend the teacher in public even if the teacher indeed made a mistake. Accord-
ing to one interviewee,
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In my opinion, if a student, in front of everybody, purposely makes difficulties for
the teacher or deliberately contradicts the teacher, it shows he does not understand
the Dao. Usually we say ‘I don’t know’ (wo bu zhi dao). In fact what he does not
know is the Dao, which is the ‘truth’ (daoli). Going against the teacher in public
is not in line with the truth in any case.
The well-disciplined manners of obeying the authority of the teacher were disclosed
to be the core of the ‘truth’ in students’ eyes. It is noteworthy that students embraced
the value of compliance with teachers not blindly but reflexively, on the basis of
reflecting upon the suitability of their conduct in terms of the Dao (the Way) in social
interactions. The ‘truth’ or the Dao referred to here, according to my interviewees, is
linked to the doctrine of the mean (zhongyong), whose intention was neither to make
the teachers embarrassed in front of other people nor to keep silent if the teacher did
make mistakes. Instead, as several of my interviewees stated, the appropriate situation
was in private where students could express different opinions to teachers.
Concluding Remarks: the Institutional Dilemma
In cultivating students into a new version of Confucian cultural citizens, the discourses
of individuality have contributed on the one side to these students disentangling their
relationship with the ‘immoral’ state-maintained systematic schools and on the other
side to their consciousness of their cultural right to choose the ‘morally good’ classical
education. In the meantime, the dynamic of being an independent and autonomous self
was not aimed at cutting off their social relations with others, but directed their efforts
towards a moral self-transformation by embedding the value of individuality into an
ethical relationship, which was a process through which they became moral individuals
who not only had the qualities of self-regulation, self-management, self-supervision
and self-development, but were also able to reflexively show compassion and respon-
sibility for others.
However, there existed a problematic tendency to inhibit the moral self-governing
individuality by the authoritarian discourses and practices, which were based on the
notion of a cultural/moral hierarchy, making students regard teachers as superior to
themselves in both cultural capabilities and moral cultivation, and consequently legit-
imizing their obedience to teachers. While almost all of my interviewees described their
teachers in similar language to their own parents and felt like they were at home when
studied in the classical school, they not only took it for granted if the teachers, for
example, punished them by hitting their hands, but also appreciated teachers for taking
responsibility for their personal development and moral improvement. In brief, the
practical and discursive paradoxes, at their core being individualism versus authoritar-
ianism that is based on cultural hierarchy, reveal the complexity and intricacy of
creating Confucian cultural citizens in contemporary China.
If one puts the paradox of forging Confucian cultural citizenship in the context of a
wider social perspective, we may find it is actually part of the moral contradictoriness
of the Chinese path to individualization, where the entanglement of old and new ethics,
of collective and individualistic values, and of responsibility-centered and rights-
centered moral practices, has constituted a challenge to contemporary China’s moral
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landscape ([40], p.72). As Yan [39, 40] convincingly argued, the most fundamental
change in post-Mao Chinese society has been the rise of the individual, and the
individual has for the first time become an independent unit in Chinese public
discourses. Although Yan partially presupposes that Confucian ethics emphasize the
absolute primacy and supremacy of the collective over the individual ([40], p.43), my
research reveals a different social fact that Confucian education not only philosophi-
cally pays attention to cultivating the individualistic spirit but also actually ‘awakens’
students to become a moral and self-governing individual. More importantly, critical
reflection upon the ‘immorality’ of the state-maintained systematic schools, as men-
tioned earlier, together with the enhancement of moral individualism in reading
classical literature, further transformed the ‘self’ consciousness of students into an
awareness of cultural citizenship rights, especially when they gradually acquired the
qualities and abilities of self-choice and self-determination.
This shows that moral reflexivity or ethical reflection serves as a dynamic for
individuals to dis-embed from an old social category (i.e. the state-sponsored
educational regime) and to re-embed in a new type (i.e. the private classical
school). The dimensions of dis-embedding and re-embedding are two fundamental
aspects in the individualization theory ([1], p.128). Although the individualization
theory also indicates a third dimension, namely the loss of traditional security [1],
the case of classical students in my research exhibits an opposite story that the
reconstructed ‘traditional’ security in the old-style Confucian private school was
exactly what individuals pursued, whereas the ‘modern’ security in the systematic
schools was what they aimed to reject. There was a reversal in the cultural
discourses reproduced by students in the classical school, indicating that the
‘modern’ (specifically, systematic education) was expressed as the ‘backward’
method of education while the ‘ancient’ (classical education) was seen as the more
‘advanced’. In terms of Beck’s compressed modernity [3, 39, 40], ‘pre-modern’
Confucian education was strategically transformed into a ‘modern’ (‘advanced’)
concept, while ‘modern’ state-maintained education was tactically labeled as a ‘pre-
modern’ (‘backward’) idea. There is indeed a symbolic ‘compressed modernity’
(‘pre-modern’ and ‘modern’) coexisting in students’ discursive repertoires, but it
also shows the reverse strategic manipulation of the discursive boundaries.
More importantly, from a wider societal perspective, the resurgence of Confucian
individualism in particular and the revival of cultural conservatism in general are
occurring in the context of reflexive modernization, a type of modernity that confronts
or even deconstructs itself unconsciously in an institutional way ([2], pp.175–77; [9],
pp.36–40). Specific to this case, Confucian thoughts are being employed by the
individualized students as a potential negating power against the modern systematic
school itself, at least in the subjective domain. Admittedly, it is too rash to conclude that
the revival of classical cultural values has constituted the deconstruction of the overall
modern values established by the socialist party-state. As a matter of fact, as I will
discuss later, it is more productive to see it the other way around. Nonetheless, at the
very least, the reappearance of Confucian ethics indeed promotes the development of
moral individualism that may be considered as part of the Chinese individualization
process, which directly challenges the legitimacy of state-sponsored systematic educa-
tion, a ‘modern’ educational configuration established for the pursuit of modernity
since the early twentieth century.
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However, students’ moral individualization is also influenced, directly or indirectly,
by the state and society. As Yan ([39], p.509) comprehensively demonstrates, Chinese
individualization is a party-state managed pattern, whereby the state plays a key role in
directing the flow of individualization. Nevertheless, Yan underestimates the role of
society. In my research, both the state and society (specifically, the job market)
contribute to the development of Confucian cultural citizenship, and result in an
institutional quandary for students in the classical school. Specifically, in claiming their
cultural right to choose the ‘morally good’ education they prefer, students were trapped
into a social dilemma about their citizenship status, where on the one hand they asserted
the cultural legitimacy of reading classics in order to become genuine Chinese citizens
and on the other hand they were anxious about their education experience being
recognized and denounced either by the state or by the market. Specific to my case
study classical school, even though it was officially awarded with a legal license by the
local government to run a school for young people’s compulsory education, it had not
systematically set up state-stipulated compulsory courses, such as Chinese language,
mathematics, English language, and science. As a result, students worried about failing
to ‘connect the dots’ (jiegui) with the education in the systematic schools. Indeed,
almost all of my interviewees expressed their thoughts of ‘returning to the systematic
schools’ (huigui tizhi), as they perceived it to be an institutional guarantee to secure an
academic certificate officially acknowledged by the state and the job market. The
anxiety worsened among the older students, who faced the crossroads of either entering
a higher school or going to university, as a 17-year-old male interviewee told me:
This question [going to university] must be considered! This is my feeling. I have
to think about it as well as other things in the future. A person cannot be too
idealistic. He must have an ideal, but he cannot be too idealistic. Otherwise he
would be lost, just thinking, thinking, and thinking, [but the mind is] empty.
The most fundamental factor provoking their anxiety was the achievement of a
recognized diploma from a university or college, which in my opinion can be seen as an
embodiment of institutionalized security that might to a certain extent assure students’
social status. Another example that is indicative of the anxiety about social status was
the story of ‘an excellent representative student (A) in the circle of classical education’
as an interviewee (B) told me. Student A had insisted on reading classics for nearly a
decade up to 2012, the longest period of time for a student I had ever heard, but gave it
up and left the school, and was engaged in an insignificant job. In the view of
interviewee B, the story of student A exacerbated student B’s anxiety about the social
status of students who read classics for many years:
He is such a top student, no matter in the systematic school or in the classical
school, so smart and able to learn everything extraordinarily fast. But such an
outstanding student is now at such a low status. So his story has caused some
[negative] influence on both students and parents [in the classical school].
As a result, many of my interviewees began to feel suspicious of the ‘usefulness’ of
reading classics. In ancient China, the direct purpose of reading classics was for the
imperial examination (keju), through which one could acquire certain social status if he
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succeeded. However, since the system was institutionally abolished in the early
twentieth century, the purpose of reading classics has become a problem. To revive
Confucianism requires re-legitimizing the values, significance or ‘usefulness’ of read-
ing classics. Although my interviewees said they clearly knew and faithfully believed
the morally beneficial effects of the wisdom in classical texts, they still could not
persuade themselves to undertake the huge uncertainties and enormous risks inherent in
classical education, unrecognized by the state and society alike. Therefore, a substantial
number of my interviewees admitted that they had no plan to keep on reading classics
‘forever’, but instead aspired to go to university. They held the view that studying in the
university not only endowed them with a diploma but also enhanced their all-round
competency for future employment. In their view, a university diploma was an indis-
pensable prior condition for securing a job, as one student said:
Many high-level companies require an advanced degree. They do not at first see
how good your knowledge is, but set the threshold of the degree. Anyone who
wants to work for these companies must meet their standard, or else you have no
opportunity at all to cross the threshold of the initial interview, even if you have
great learning.
However, while facing such institutional uncertainties, some of my interviewees
drew moral boundaries by denigrating Chinese universities. In their eyes, Chinese
universities were a place where, as several interviewees described, students
‘degenerated’ and ‘became irresponsible’, disliked learning, skipped classes, and
spent all day playing games and hanging out with their partners. Thus it seemed
worthless to ‘waste 4 years merely for a diploma’, as one student told me. Indeed,
many of my interviewees believed that moral cultivation (at which their classical
education was especially aimed) should be of more importance than an academic
certificate, and therefore their cultural right of reading classics in a private
classical school should be recognized socially, culturally and politically. Nonethe-
less, they were still caught in a socio-discursive dilemma that on the one hand,
they claimed for the moral legitimacy of their cultural rights in terms of discursive
resources, but on the other hand, they had to anchor their hopes in obtaining a
university diploma so as to relieve the anxiety of not being recognized by the state
and society in a professional setting.
All in all, classical school students have to contend with practically discursive
paradoxes within Confucian education to reform the self to become Confucian
cultural citizens, being individualistic, self-disciplined, self-reliant and self-
governing, as well as obedient, filial, benevolent and responsible. Yet they also
face an institutional predicament in their efforts to strive for recognition of their
cultural citizenship from the state and society alike. Therefore, as morally
reflexive and ethically individualistic citizens, they have to establish a better
position in order to cultivate a more consistent and compatible package of
Confucian cultural citizenship. Institutional reform in the educational system is
fundamental in order to create a more tolerant cultural-political environment and
provide support to the private classical school, and finally to establish a system-
atic bridge to connect classical education with the next stage of advanced studies
either in classical educational institutions or in state-maintained schools.
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